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Abstract
This article explores the wave of democratization that swept through Latin America during the
1980s. The article addresses attempts at political reform in Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. It specifically
explores the attempts at political reform in Argentina and focuses on the power of the Argentine
presidency as well as efforts at constitutional reform. It examines the broad constitutional powers
given to the Argentine President and delineates how hyper-presidentialism has contributed to the
expansion of presidential authority. The benefits of a parliamentary system are discussed as well
as the difficulties in maintaining democracy under a purely presidential system. Finally the article
examines the dangers of adopting a purely parliamentary system within Latin American countries
accustomed to strong presidential systems and considers the adoption of a mixed parliamentary
system. The article promotes the adoption of a system in which there is a separation of the Head of
State from the head of the government, parliamentary participation in the formation of government,
and electoral participation in the formation of the Executive.
ESSAY
THE DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA*
Carlos Santiago Nino **
A wave of democratization swept Latin America during the
1980s. Unprecedented interest in reforming government insti-
tutions followed the democratization in order to consolidate
the new, weak democracies.' Interest in institutional reform
may be attributed, at least in part, to two factors. Initially, this
interest in reform attempted to overcome an undervaluation,
based upon a vulgarized form of Marxism, of the impact of in-
stitutional structures on social forces. Additionally, one may
attribute the reform to the weakness of existing governmental
institutions that became more evident in the new democracies
than in the prior governments.
Concern for institutional reform is natural because this
wave of democratization, unlike previous ones, is expanding
despite a hostile environment. The countries undergoing de-
mocratization face severe economic crises. When a country
enjoys economic prosperity, almost any system of government
seems functional, as evidenced by the enormous variety of gov-
ernments in Western Europe: constitutional monarchies and
republics; federal and unitary organizations; parliamentary,
semi-parliamentary, and semi-presidential regimes; two-party
and multi-party systems; proportional representation or win-
ner-take-all districts; etc. When there are massive social de-
mands creating constant pressure upon the political system,
with little possibility of satisfying them, it is crucial to deter-
mine which system best resists that pressure at the lowest cost
to legitimacy, while preserving maximum stability.
Institutional change has taken shape through important
* This Essay has been translated from the original Spanish by Michael E. Roll of
the Fordham International Law Journal.
** Professor of Law, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Professor Nino was
also a close advisor to former President Alfonsin.
1. See Trends: Growing Demand for Change of Course, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-92-
32, Aug. 20, 1992, at 6-7 (discussing several countries' reasons for recent clamor for
reform).
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reforms such as those undertaken by Brazil in 19882 and by
Colombia in 1990.' These reforms deserve attention because,
aside from introducing new institutional mechanisms, they
represent aspirations of a social constitutionalism to respond
to the principal threat to Latin American democracies: the dis-
content of the people over the inability of the government to
satisfy their basic needs.
These reforms, however, do not reflect movements that
have been growing for various years in Chile, Brazil, Vene-
zuela, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay, movements
pushing for profound transformation of the traditional institu-
tions of government in Latin America. These ambitious move-
ments focus upon reform of a dominant institution in the
Americas: the presidency. The presidency is also a peculiarly
Latin American institution.4
Although I was involved in the Bolivian and, to some .de-
gree, in the discussions concerning the Brazilian and Chilean
reform movements, shortness of space forces me to limit my
discussion to the case of my country, Argentina. Rather than
recount the specific debates on the reform movement in Ar-
gentina, I will describe the position I took in the debate. In
other South American countries, there was an interesting
movement to reform the Chilean Constitution early in the. pro-
cess of democratization, including a debate over the adoption
of a pure parliamentary system. The Chilean movement, how-
ever, now seems to have lost force.' In Brazil, the current con-
stitution provides for a referendum in the current year 1993 on
the type of state and design of government.6 In Venezuela,
constitutional reform is heavily debated in light of the public
2. See Colombia: Constituent Polls Approved by Court, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-90-
41, Oct. 25, 1990, at 2-3 (discussing dissension over whether Court had power to
approve such an assembly for reform).
3. See Colombia: Reform Referendum Widely Criticised, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-
89-47, Nov. 30, 1989, at 10-11 (proposing that reforms grant too many powers to
president, including robbing the court of power of judicial review).
4. See generally Fred W. Riggs, The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-consti-
tutional Practices, 9 INr'L POL. Sci. REV. 247, 248-50 (1988) (emphasizing differences
between U.S. and Latin American presidential systems).
5. Chile: Inside View of the Reform Package, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-92-23, June
18, 1992, at 5. This states that a healthy skepticism remains on the chances of suc-
cess of approximately 30 constitutional reforms passing, one of which is to empower
the president to remove the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. Id.
6. NOVA CONSTITU§AO BRASILEIRA, tit. 9, art. 2.
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confidence crisis faced by the current government. 7 In Peru,
the Fujimori government called a constitutional convention
with the alleged aim of improving institutions after the authori-
tarian steps taken by the present regime.8 In Uruguay, reform
proposals on institutional organization have been presented.9
In Bolivia, the first step in the process of reforming the Consti-
tution in significant respects-though in a direction less parlia-
mentarian than originally intended-was completed in April
1993.
Returning to Argentina, there has been continuous public
debate on constitutional reform. In March 1986, President
Raul Alfonsin asked his advisory body on structural reform,
the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, to study con-
stitutional reform. Through the work of technical commis-
sions and after consulting ample sectors of society, the Council
produced two opinions favoring constitutional reform, one in
October 1986 and one in August 1987.10
The Alfonsin government held face-to-face talks with the
opposition on the content of constitutional reform. These
conversations led to a joint declaration in January 1988 by
President Alfonsin and Governor Antonio Cafiero, head of the
principal opposition party, the Peronists, on the general orien-
tation of reform." Toward the end of 1988, there were meet-
ings between the two principal candidates of the 1989 presi-
dential elections-Governor Carlos Menem for the Peronists
and Governor Eduardo Angeloz for the Radicals. Although
7. Venezuela: Assessing Perez's First 100 Days, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-89-19,
May 19, 1989, at 10. Venezuela's condition in 1989 was called "the most severe crisis
faced by any president in the 31 years since the country restored democratic rule."
Id.
8. See generally Peru: Conflicts of Power Start Looming, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-
91-49, Dec. 19, 1991, at 3 (discussing tortured relations between President Fujimori
and Peruvian Congress).
9. But see Uruguay: Lacalle Prepares Midterm Reshuffle, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-
93-0 1, Jan. 7, 1993, at I (calling recent problems attributable to individuals and
thus not resolvable through either presidentialist or parliamentary changes).
10. I coordinated the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy from its crea-
tion in 1985 until its dissipation in 1989. See Carlos S. Nino, Transition to Democracy,
Corporatism and Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 163
(1989) (discussing reform movements in Latin American countries).
11. Alfonsih and Opposition Chief Agree on Constitutional Reform, Reuters, Jan. 14,
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File (stating that these leaders of
opposing parties agreed on the need to reform the constitution).
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the two candidates reached oral agreement on reform, no joint
action materialized due to the ongoing electoral campaign.' 2
Shortly after assuming power in 1989, and increasingly
during his administration, President Menem and numerous
government officials demonstrated unequivocal interest in
constitutional reform, primarily to permit re-election of the
president. Also, the Peronist party approved a document rec-
ommending constitutional reform that focuses upon the or-
ganization of power.
A fallacy of "undue abstraction," however, causes consid-
erable confusion in the Argentine debate over constitutional
reform. Alternatives were presented in terms of "favoring" or
"rejecting" reform itself, without clarifying whether a particu-
lar reform is favored or rejected. In other words, an incorrect
impression of popular consensus is given because the issue is
described in abstract form; for some politicians, no reform is
better than the specific reform proposed by opposition mem-
bers.
When the Alfonsin government asked the Council for the
Consolidation of Democracy to study the possibility of consti-
tutional reform, 13 it expressly excluded modification of Mr. Al-
fonsin's presidential mandate, including modification of the
prohibition on re-election. Avoiding the issue of modification
of the prohibition on re-election permitted the debate to focus
upon issues of great institutional importance.
Under President Menem, by contrast, it is clear that the
central issue of constitutional reform is the re-election of Presi-
dent Menem. The re-election issue results in a resistance to
debate on the necessity of reform. Additional reform propos-
als, the majority of which coincide with those introduced by
decree by the military government in 1972, acquire a pretex-
tual character.' 4 Although these proposals could be debated
12. See Argentina Halts Constitution Reform, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1988, at 4 (stating
that constitutional reform had sunk on both candidates' list of priorities).
13. See Argentina: Alfonszh Assesses Elections, Suspends Constitutional Changes, BBC,
Summary of World Broadcasts, Sept. 22, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File (showing how President Alfonsin distanced himself personally from
any changes recommended, and suspended the changes recommended until a major-
ity referendum could be achieved on them).
14. These positions included shortening the term of the president to four years,
direct election of the president and senators, shortening the term of senators, and
inclusion of an additional senator for the majority party.
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in the context of comprehensive reform, no one seriously be-
lieves that they are important enough per se to justify a consti-
tutional convention and its risks.
What are the risks of a constitutional convention? The
principal risk is the production of a profound division in soci-
ety and the exclusion of important sectors of society. Ex-
cluded sectors may question the legitimacy of the convention
or the fairness of the reformed system. Exclusionary reform
has already occurred in Argentina on various occasions. The
Constitutions of 1819 and 1826 excluded the Federalists. 5
This century, the Constitution of 1949 excluded opponents of
Peronism. 16 Subsequently, however, the constitutional con-
vention reforms of 1957 in turn excluded the Peronists.i 7
A constitution, then, must be the result of broad consen-
sus; it must be seen as a constitution for all Argentines, not as
the constitution for a particular party. A plebiscite on a partic-
ular constitutional reform, announced each time the Menem
government fails to reach an agreement with the opposition
Radical party, also carries considerable risk: the population is
presented with the alternatives of "favoring" or "rejecting"
constitutional reform, which is not sensible, or it is presented
with the specific content of a reform, which carries the risk of
radically dividing society. Additionally, there are risks that the
constitutional convention will improperly assume powers that
do not correspond to any other body in a constitutional sys-
tem, and that a relative and narrow majority will undermine
constitutional practice developed over the course of a century-
and-a-half. The Menem government's court-packing increases
these risks because there are doubts over the impartiality of
the Supreme Court, the highest body of government in charge
of controlling the constitutionality of all constitutional conven-
tions.i" Given the serious risks, a constitutional convention is
15. See DAVID RoCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1987: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO
ALFONSiN 92-93 (1988) (explaining how constitution affronted Federalists).
16. Id. at 306 (stating how Per6n used his powers under constitution to create
"a state of internal war" with opponents).
17. See id. at 333-37 (describing how Peronists were excluded from Argentine
government). New penalties were imposed on Peronists after the Constitution of
1949 was abolished in May, 1956. Id. at 335; see Nino, supra note 10, at 162 (describ-
ing proscription of Peronist party).
18. See Argentina: Menem Targets the Supreme Court, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-89-
40, Oct. 12, 1989, at 2-3 (describing motivations and reactions to Menem's court-
1992-1993] 639
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justified only when reform results from a diagnosis that the ex-
isting constitutional structure is dysfunctional, and that the
dysfunctionality affects consolidation of democracy as well as
the preservation and promotion of basic human rights.
The project proposed by the Council for the Consolida-
tion of Democracy during the previous government was the re-
sult of such diagnosis.' 9 .An important factor of Argentine in-
stitutional weakness, though certainly not the only one, was the
formation of a hyper-atrophied presidency throughout Argen-
tine history.20 To this extent, there is substantial similarity be-
tween the evolution of Argentine constitutional practice and
that of the majority of Latin American countries.
As shown in an investigation by the Center for Institu-
tional Studies, Argentine hyper-presidentialism is partly the re-
sult of Argentine constitutional provisions designed by Juan
Bautista Alberdi, the intellectual father of the Argentine Con-
stitution. 21 Argentine constitutional provisions differ from
U.S. constitutional provisions on significant issues.22 They do
not require the president to seek the advice and consent of the
Senate in selecting his Cabinet, a typical parliamentary mecha-
nism incorporated into the U.S. Constitution. 23  Unlike the
U.S. Constitution, the Argentine Constitution gives the presi-
dent various powers in the event of a state of siege.2 4 Simi-
larly, the Argentine Constitution gives the president powers
regarding federal intervention where the U.S. Constitution
packing plan); Argentina: Justice Minister Resigns Over Row, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-
89-41, Oct. 19, 1989, at 11 (same).
19. See Nino, supra note 10, at 163-64 (discussing proposals of this Council).
20. THOMAS E. WEIL ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR ARGENTINA 185 (1974) [here-
inafter AREA HANDBOOK]. "Theoretically, the [Argentine] government has been
based on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches but, in fact, the executive
branch has dominated Argentina's government and society at large." Id.
21. See id. at 186; see also ROCK, supra note 15, at 123-24 (discussing powers of
executive branch and how they were based on Alberdi's tract Les Bases).
22. See AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 185-90. Significant differences in-
clude the Argentine powers to declare a state of siege, suspend civil liberties guaran-
teed under the constitution, appointment of cabinet and federal judiciary personnel,
and the ability to introduce legislation. See infra note 24 and accompanying test (dis-
cussing state of siege powers). The Argentine system also provides for an electoral
system based upon direct voting. AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 192.
23. See AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 187 (discussing the lack of provision
for advice and consent).
24. See id. at 187-88. The president has the power to declare a state of siege as
well as the power to suspend most constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. Id.
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does not.25 Hyper-presidentialism also results from the prac-
tices of successive executives who enlarged their powers at the
expense of a resigned Congress, and with the blessing of the
Supreme Court.26
The expansive practice of the exercise of power by the ex-
ecutive, at the expense of federal and even provincial powers,
has contributed further to the formation of hyper-presidential-
ism. Several methods illustrate this consolidation. The presi-
dent can delegate legislative power or promulgate "necessity"
and "urgency" decrees, of which extreme use has been made
lately. 27 The president can also create powerful agencies. The
president can abuse its veto power, especially a partial veto, as
a weapon to reformulate laws. Weakening of administrative
controls also allows presidential influence in legislative areas,
and is portrayed by the Menem government's removal of the
Attorney General, various government prosecutors, and al-
most all the members of the Court of Government Accounts.
Furthermore, the president is empowered to interfere with the
process of approving the budget and investments, and pardon
those accused but not yet convicted of crimes, especially those
accused of human rights violations. These mechanisms, to-
gether with the abuse of the state of siege and federal interven-
tion, have enormously expanded the presidency.28
According to many influential political scientists, Argen-
tine hyper-presidentialism has aggravated dysfunctionalities
associated with presidential systems. 29 No president since
1928 has completed his term under the Constitution of 1853.
Moreover, it is clear to any impartial observer that the crisis
faced by Isabel Per6n in 1976, which ended in a military over-
25. See id. at 185, 187 (commenting that provincial and local government is lim-
ited by federal government intervention).
26. See id. at 190. "Although the Supreme Court has declared legislation or acts
of the executive branch to be constitutional, the practice of judicial review is not
carried out as extensively as in the United States." Id.
27. Don Podesta, South America's Trickle-Down Democracy; Elected Rulers Find Ways to
Impose Programs over Faction Ridden Legislatures, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1992, at A28
(describing how Menem has used over 100 such decrees during the first three years
of his presidency, while Alfonsin had used only eight while in office for five and one-
half years).
28. See generally AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 185-90.
29. See generally Nino, supra note 10, at 162 (listing additional powers enjoyed by
Argentine president not enjoyed by U.S. president).
1992-1993]
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throw, 30 or by Raul Alfonsin in 1989, that compelled Al-
fonsin's resignation, 3' could have been resolved differently in
the framework of a parliamentary or mixed-parliamentary form
of government. A parliamentary framework would have facili-
tated a less traumatic transition through the resignation of the
government and its replacement by another. Today, the rigid-
ity of presidentialism is shown fully in the crises faced by coun-
tries such as Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil, the last of which has
had finally a successful, though difficult, resolution. 2
Political scientists agree that parliamentary democracies
are much more stable statistically than presidential forms of
government, even under enormously difficult conditions, as
shown by the case of India. 3 Presidential forms of govern-
ment exist only in the United States, which introduced the
form of government, in Latin America, and in some Asian and
African countries. Except for the United States, there is no ec-
onomically developed democratic country that has a presiden-
tial form of government.
Political scientists, however, have gone beyond statistical
valuations. While recognizing that a form of government is
never the sole nor most important cause of crisis and failure of
democracy, political scientists have formulated principles to
explain why democracies are more fragile under pure presi-
dential systems. Other causes of crisis and failure of democ-
racy frequently mentioned include (i) abuse of authority per-
mitted by the lack of adequate parliamentary control on the
executive; (ii) diminished representation caused by lack of mi-
nority participation in formation of governments and the rigid-
ity of the system in adapting to changes in societal consensus;
(iii) lack of escape valves during times of crisis; (iv) dynamic
confrontation between political parties created by presidential-
ism's zero-sum game (especially when the parties are disci-
30. See id. at 153 (discussing Isabel Per6n's crises).
31. See generally id. at 163 (commenting on circumstances surrounding Alfonsin's
resignation).
32. See, e.g., Peru: Conflicts of Power Start Looming, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., WR-91-
49, Dec. 19, 1991, at 3 (discussing tortured relations between President Fujimori and
Peruvian Congress).
33. See, e.g., Riggs, supra note 4, at 248-50 (discussing how other countries that
followed a parliamentary system modeled after France or Britain, such as India, have
avoided troubles plaguing those that have adopted a presidentialist constitution,
such as Korea, South Vietnam, Liberia, and other Latin American countries).
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plined, which increases gridlock among the branches of gov-
ernment when they are held by different political parties); (v)
difficulty forming broad multi-party consensus and coalitions;
and (vi) personalization of power, where the faults of a particu-
lar president cause resentment of government institutions. 4
As a result of hyper-presidentialism, there are situations
where Argentina, like many other Latin American countries,
has a president with enormous formal powers, but who has lost
popular support and is stuck in a dynamic confrontation with
opposition parties. The lack of an institutional resolution of
the situation creates power vacuums that are filled by corpo-
rate groups such as the military, the business sector, the un-
ions, and the Church. In exchange for conditional support of
the president, these groups take advantage of the situation to
obtain sectorial advantages, or they change the situation
through extra-constitutional methods.
When these causes are further developed, they seem suffi-
cient to explain statistical data that show scarce stability in
presidential systems of government, especially when the sys-
tems have organic political parties and proportional represen-
tation systems. The dysfunctionalities become increasingly po-
tent in a hyper-presidential system like the Argentine one.
In a presidential system that is carefully calibrated, like
that of the United States, the dysfunctionalities are less prob-
lematic. Apart from the case of Mexico, the current system in
Argentina is possibly the most extreme form of presidentialism
in the world, placing it in line with semi-authoritarian systems.
Nonetheless, recognition of the defects of presidentialism
does not necessarily imply that a pure parliamentary system is
better for Latin American countries. Many objections are usu-
ally made to parliamentary systems; most are incorrect because
they do not account for the variety of parliamentary systems.
The objections tend to focus on the systems of the Third and
Fourth French Republics or the current Italian system, without
considering others such as those of Germany or Portugal. The
34. See id. at 256-59 (explaining how the United States has avoided such
problems by maintaining an appropriate balance of aggressive/passive, or imperial/
complaisant qualities in presidential temperament that other countries have not been
able to attain). Highly personal regimes must often resort to violence to sustain their
legitimacy. Id. at 274 n. 11.
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principal objection against the parliamentary system is that it
implies government instability.
The response to this argument is twofold. First, one must
consider the extent to which governmental instability is unde-
sirable. One should consider whether governmental instability
helps maintain the overall stability of the system of govern-
ment, and whether it promotes the perpetual existence of a
governing class which, as in the case of Italy, favors develop-
ment of the country. It should also be noted that government
instability in some parliamentary systems has resulted in the
creation of a solid continuous public administration. Second,
there are mechanisms that' parliamentary system countries,
such as Germany and Spain, have adopted that are very effec-
tive in avoiding governmental instability. Constructive cen-
sure is one such mechanism. While censure in those countries,
as well as in Great Britain, has been scarce, the possibility of
censure accounts for those systems not having the dysfunction-
alities of presidentialism.
A pure parliamentary system has other disadvantages.
One disadvantage of a pure parliamentary system is that it hin-
ders adoption of defined policies when there is a stalemate
among diverse political forces, forcing the government into pa-
ralysis. The paralysis is aggravated when, as in the case of
Israel, there are political groups that have scarce electoral sup-
port but are necessary to the formation of a government; mi-
nority parties can blackmail majority parties to adopt minority
policies. Also, indirect election of the executive may create a
societal feeling of alienation from the government and a per-
ception that there is a perpetual political class in power. Par-
liament is not always a loyal intermediary between the electo-
rate and the government.
Another disadvantage is that a president that is a head of
state, but without governing power, might not be accepted eas-
ily in societies accustomed to strong presidents, such as those
of Latin America. There will be pressure to increase the presi-
dent's powers and the pressure may be taken advantage of and
used by the president, as occurred in Brazil. When Brazil
adopted a parliamentary form of government, the military did
not want Joao Goulart to have plenary power when he replaced
Janio Quadros as the head of state. In response, President
Goulart successfully mobilized society to reform the constitu-
LA TIN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
tion and re-establish a presidential system of government. The
military staged a coup d'etat in 1964.-"
Recognition of the disadvantages of pure parliamentarism
leads one to consider adoption of a mixed form of govern-
ment, as urged by various sectors in Italy and Israel. Of
course, one must analyze the attributes of a mixed "semi-presi-
dential" or "semi-parliamentary" system. Certainly, there is a
great variety of mixed regimes, as observed in France, Portu-
gal, Finland, Austria, and Iceland. As well, there are a variety
of other reforms under consideration in other countries, such
as the one presented to the Israeli Parliament by a commission
of law professors from the University of Tel Aviv.
To test the merits of these systems, it is first necessary to
put aside labels and analyze the mechanisms that allow these
systems to overcome the difficulties of the pure presidential
and parliamentary systems. Otherwise, Juan Linz warns that
one runs the risk of adopting a system that combines, rather
than eliminates, the defects.3"
In Argentina, there has been much confusion that a mixed
system is created by the existence of a prime minister or, as
one sector of Peronism proposes, a coordinating minister.
This is a mistake: such a figure may exist, as in Peru, but the
system nonetheless continues as a pure presidential system. In
Peru, the prime minister, known by few, did not play any rele-
vant role in the crisis caused by the closure of Parliament or-
dered by President Alberto Fujimori. Whether the nomination
and removal of the prime minister or coordinating minister de-
pends entirely on the president, or whether (even with the pos-
sibility of parliamentary censure) the functions of the prime
minister are not those of head of state but depend fundamen-
tally upon the delegation by the president, the introduction of
this organ of government does not fundamentally alter the na-
ture of the presidential system nor serve to overcome its diffi-
culties.
35. See Nino, supra note 10, at 159 (describing how such increase in power some-
times invites retaliation, and hence, instability).
36. See generally Juan J. Linz, Democracia Presidencial o Parliamentaria, Hay Alguna
Diferencia?, PARA LA CONSOLIDACION DE LA DEMOCRACIA, PRESIDENCIALISMO VS. PARLA-
MENTARISMO: MATERIALES PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA REFORMA CONSTITUTIONAL 19, 26
(1988).
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Existence of a genuine mixed system of government oc-
curs under the following conditions.
A. Separation of the Head of State from the Head of Government
This is a substantial element for neutralizing the various
defects of presidential systems such as abuse and personaliza-
tion of power, as well as for relaxing the rigidity of the system
that weakens representation and stability by not offering ap-
propriate "escape valves."
The separation of the head of state and the head of gov-
ernment is one of the most delicate aspects of a mixed system
of government. If the two powers are not clearly distin-
guished, or if they are superimposed, as with the powers of
defense and foreign affairs in the French system, there is a risk
of serious conflict between the two holders of power. Also, if
the power of the head of government is blurred with only
subordinate powers given to the head of government, such as
being head of public administration, or powers are granted to
the head of government by the head of state, the system will
not overcome the difficulties and defects of the presidential
system.
For a mixed system to function, especially in the political
conditions of Latin America, the separation of both positions
should be clear. The head of state must represent unity of the
country and continuity of democratic institutions, be above
partisan division, represent the country abroad, and open ses-
sions of Congress. The head of state could nominate candi-
dates for permanent government positions, such as judges. It
is also possible to grant him powers to be exercised in times of
crisis such as those of declaring states of siege or federal inter-
vention. Other powers of the head of state might include the
power to dissolve Parliament and call new elections. The head
of state might have some veto power over legislation or
presenting requests ofjudicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation to the Supreme Court. Naturally, he should have
the highest degree of protocol of the country.
Government powers exercised daily should be granted to
the head of government. He should be able to set state policy
and to name a cabinet, appear periodically before Congress to
debate and to defend his policies, introduce and veto legisla-
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tion, and be commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Finally,
he should control public agencies.
Under the current Argentine constitutional structure, Ar-
ticle 86 inferentially gives the president four leadership posi-
tions: leader of the country, the public administration, the
Federal District, and the armed forces.3 7 A new governmental
system, therefore, would imply 'that the executive should be di-
vided between a head of state and a head of government,
where the head of government would have power over public
administration and the armed forces. Power over the Federal
District should be replaced by a popularly elected governor.
It should be noted that division of executive power is not
dependent upon the label attributed to each head. The head
of state could be called "President of the Republic/Nation," as
in France or Portugal, and the head of government could be
called "Prime Minister" or "Coordinating Minister." How-
ever, given the association people make between government
and president, it may be wise to name the head of government
"President" or "President of the Council of Ministers," as in
Spain or Italy, and to call the other official simply "Head of
State."
B. Parliamentary Participation in the Formation of Government
Parliamentary participation in the formation of govern-
ment is decisive in overcoming the difficulties of presidential-
ism. It is also common to all mixed and parliamentary systems.
If Parliament does not participate in the formation of a govern-
ment, it is not possible to overcome the abuse of power associ-
ated with presidentialism. Nor is it possible to attenuate the
dynamic confrontation among political parties; nor to increase
representation; nor is it easy to form multipartisan coalitions;
nor does it include escape valves to confront political crises.
Parliamentary participation in the formation of a govern-
ment establishes the notion that the government is responsible
to Parliament. Responsibility to Parliament includes account-
ing for the government's acts and submitting itself to the con-
trols established by Parliament.
Participation in the formation of government may occur
37. See CONSTITUCI6N ARGENTINA [Constitution] art. 86.
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through diverse methods. One method is through the require-
ment of a vote of confidence for the head of government and
his cabinet to assume power. Or, participation may consist
only of the possibility of censure through varying majorities,
from simple to super to absolute. Censure may also be con-
structive where it is impossible to topple a government without
the formation of a new government by a majority.
A vote of confidence prior to government formation might
be required where the head of government has limited popular
legitimacy. Constructive censure might be employed here by
requiring an absolute majority to carry a censure motion for-
ward. Requirement of a larger majority might result in the
censure mechanism becoming inoperative and creating more
of a true political trial.
Censure should be accompanied by the power of the head
of state or government to dissolve the House of Deputies and
call new elections. Many times it is wrongly thought that intro-
duction of this element goes too far toward parliamentarism.
Without this power, there is no countervailing power to cen-
sure which might be exercised irresponsibly as occurred to-
ward the end of the last century and beginning of this century
in the parliamentary system of Chile.
C. Electoral Participation in the Formation of the Executive
Just as the mixed system takes the prior two elements from
parliamentarism, it takes electoral participation in the constitu-
tion of the executive from presidentialism. Electoral participa-
tion neutralizes the disadvantages of parliamentarism related
to the possibility of stalemates and excessive intercession in
the confirmation of the executive.
While mixed systems are characterized by electoral partici-
pation, they differ greatly on the role of elections in the forma-
tion of the executive. It is clearly disadvantageous for both the
head of state and head of government to be elected by popular
vote. Popular election of both could increase conflicts be-
tween the two executives because each could allege legitimacy
derived from the people. The head of state might assert that
he was elected by a larger majority and the head of govern-
ment would assert he was elected by a more recent majority
that more accurately reflects popular sentiment. For these rea-
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sons, actual or projected mixed systems only permit the head
of state or the head of government to be popularly elected, but
not both.
1. Current Mixed Systems
Popular election of the head of state has been adopted by
current mixed systems such as those in France and Portugal.
Popular election of the head of state is consistent with the head
of state retaining powers of government not shared with
others, as in France. Retention of power, however, is undesir-
able because of the superimposition of the powers of the head
of government because all areas of government are intercon-
nected. When the head of state does not exercise power inde-
pendently, there may be tension between the legitimacy he en-
joys if popularly elected, and the limits on his powers. In a
similar sense, there may be tension between the lack of direct
popular legitimacy of the head of government and the breadth
of his powers.
The possible tension between the legitimacy of the head
of state and his lack of powers of government, however, has
not created difficulties in mixed systems because the head of
state, while not governing directly, has the power to designate
the head of government, with or without a vote of confidence
by Parliament. This aspect permits the creation of a dynamic
mixed system of government characterized by the following
phases.
First, the head of state enjoys legitimacy by virtue of his
direct election. While the head of state may not govern di-
rectly, he may govern effectively through the head of govern-
ment he designates; given his direct election by the people, it
will not be easy for Parliament to censure the government.
Even if the threat of censure exists, the head of state may util-
ize his power to dissolve Parliament and call new elections.
Second, the head of state may lose popular support, as oc-
curred in France when Franqois Mitterand had to accept co-
habitation with Jacques Chirac.3" During the second phase,
38. See William Drozdiak, French Socialist Calls For 'Big Bang' Revival of Party as
Voters Turn Away, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1993, at A28 (commenting on the weakening
aspects of cohabitation). "Cohabitation" describes the situation that first occurred in
1986, when Mitterand, the Socialist President, was forced to name the conservative
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the president has no option but to negotiate with the opposi-
tion the designation of a head of government that will neces-
sarily adopt independent policies, especially if, unlike France,
he holds all the powers of government. The head of state
should limit himself to representing the unity of the country
without becoming involved in day-to-day politics.
2. Toward a New Mixed System
A mixed system where the head of government is elected,
rather than the head of state, does not create the tension be-
tween legitimacy and limited government power. The head of
government would have popular support while the head of
state should be designated indirectly through Parliament.
Generally, a supermajority in both houses of Congress would
be required to assure that the choice of head of state is nonpar-
tisan. However, the tension created in this mixed system is be-
tween popular will and parliamentary formation of a govern-
ment. The tension may be resolved by requiring majority elec-
tion of the head of government and a vote of confidence, and
by varying the majority necessary for censure. For example, if
the head of government were elected by a broad popular ma-
jority, it would not be necessary to obtain a parliamentary vote
of confidence and censure would only be allowed by a
supermajority vote. On the other hand, if the head of govern-
ment were elected by a narrow majority, or even by a plurality,
a vote of confidence should be required and censure should be
easier to obtain.
In this second mixed system model, the head of state
should not participate in the designation of the head of gov-
ernment. If the office of head of government is vacant,
whether through censure or incapacity, the head of state could
nominate a provisional head of government until a new elec-
tion is called.
Another issue in the second model is who should have the
power to dissolve Parliament: the head of state or the head of
government? Where the head of government enjoys the
power to dissolve Parliament, the next issue is whether his
power should be permissive or mandatory upon a request for
opposition leader Chirac as the Prime Minister. Howard LaFranchi, French Socialists
Write OffMitterand, CHRISTIAN ScI. MON., Nov. 20, 1992, at 7.
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censure. In any event, where the head of government enjoys
the power to dissolve Parliament, he should resign and submit
to re-election.
The advantage of the second model is that Argentine soci-
ety would perceive it as a less drastic change, especially if the
head of government assumes the title of president of the gov-
ernment. The electorate would continue to elect the presi-
dent, although it would learn that the president is more closely
tied to Parliament. Furthermore, a new figure, the head of
state, would begin to have weight as leader of the country's
governing hierarchy.
Finally, a system of government is like a complex watch.
Precise operation of one part of the watch depends on the
proper functioning of another part. Unfortunately, space does
not permit me to develop the context in which executive
branch reform occurs. Such presidential reformation, how-
ever, obviously requires a contextual remodeling of other gov-
ernmental branches, and highlights the innumerable questions
that must be resolved to ensure the precise interworking of the
branches. How should the legislature be organized? Should it
be unicameral or bicameral? How should power be distributed
and decentralized? What is the electoral regime? How should
political parties be structured? What is the constitutional prac-
tice?
In conclusion, Argentina and other Latin American coun-
tries therefore need a more focused debate on the role and
powers of their presidents. In debating this reworking, the
countries of the region must draw on their own individual ex-
periences to formulate mechanisms that best assure legitimacy,
stability, and efficacy of government.
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